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Abstract 
Marketization of the employment relationship is a key causal factor explaining the adverse impact 
of subcontracting low-wage services on employment conditions. This article extends existing 
sociological theory by analysing the market-making and rule-breaking roles of client and 
subcontractor firms through qualitative data. It finds that client organisations construct different 
types and temporalities of marketised cost pressures, that clients and subcontractors exploit their 
power advantage over labour to evade institutional rules, and that labour process and reputational 
concerns impose a degree of moderation towards socially desirable outcomes. The theoretical 
framework ‘unpacks’ marketization by distinguishing the interplay between contracts, regulation 
and labour process requirements as shaped by clients and subcontractors. In the UK cleaning 
sector, the potentially positive effects of client and subcontractor actions on employment 
conditions are marginal, focused on non-pay aspects and introduced primarily for reputational 
reasons. The evidence indicates the limits of voluntary action and the need for regulation.  
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Introduction 
The adverse impact on employment conditions of subcontracting low-wage services, rather than 
organising them in-house, is well documented (e.g. Berlinski, 2008; Flecker and Meil, 2010; Rees 
and Fielder, 1992). Price-led competition between providers combined with clients’ intensified 
search for cost gains are held to result in a process of ‘marketization’ of the employment 
relationship. Contracting between parties seeks to predetermine many aspects of the employment 
relationship and repeated, cost-reducing transactions (Greer et al., 2017) add pressure to secure 
efficiency gains through reducing wages and employee benefits and increasing work intensity. To 
better understand these processes, relevant research on the sociology of markets has examined two 
key aspects, namely a) the mechanisms through which market actors make and reinforce market 
pressures through contract specifications and b) the mixed effects on markets in different 
regulatory environments of actors’ rule-taking and rule-breaking actions (Coe et al., 2009; 
Doellgast et al., 2015; Jaehrling and Méhaut, 2013). Marketisation is found to adversely affect 
employment conditions in general, but with a variability reflective of heterogeneous and inventive 
actions and responses of market actors.  
In theorising the implications of marketization for subcontracted low wage services, two 
further concerns that influence the contracting parties need consideration. First, the services are 
still delivered through an employment relationship with the consequence that the contract’s 
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contribution to production and value, for both the client and the subcontractor, is ambiguous and 
not predefined by market pressures (Littler and Salaman, 1982). Acknowledging the continuing 
salience of the labour process raises the possibility of market actors facing operational pressures, 
which may diminish efforts to cut subcontracting costs. While corporate financial pressures may 
encourage employers to reduce the labour process to a contract price, other requirements, such as 
for specific skills or for more flexible labour, may generate operational pressures resulting in more 
varied employment outcomes (Campbell and Peeters, 2008; Cunningham and James, 2009). A 
recognition that employee motivation and commitment still matter may also lead market actors to 
be more responsive to workers’ concerns and pursue actions aimed at more productive 
arrangements, including, for example, living wages for subcontracted service workers, extended 
collective bargaining rules, more secure working-time arrangements and strengthened compliance 
(Rubery et al., 2015; Bach and Givan, 2010; Wills, 2009). Moreover, such improvements may also 
be introduced to address a second additional concern that motivates the contracting parties, 
particularly clients, to move beyond cost factors, namely reputational effects (Lund-Thomsen and 
Nadvi, 2010). This is likely where publicity attached to contracting conditions risks reputational 
damage or where the client company or brand is looking for ways to improve its corporate social 
responsibility reputation. Improvements to the labour process may thus be a secondary outcome 
of public relations oriented actions and therefore vulnerable to displacement should the pressure 
on reputation recede. 
In accordance with these observations, this article considers marketization as an 
endogenous process dependent on the actions of market actors. To gain a more precise analytical 
understanding of how marketization impacts on employment, it investigates the multiple, 
contingent and competing roles of clients and subcontractor organisations in making markets, 
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adapting to (and evading) institutional rules, and managing the labour process and reputational 
effects. The UK contract cleaning industry was selected for investigation due to its highly cost-
competitive product market and evidence is drawn from qualitative interview data derived from 
six matched pairs of case studies. The findings confirm that market pressures on subcontracting 
cannot be considered exogenous. In particular, clients construct different types and temporalities 
of marketised cost pressures through their contracts with subcontractors. Moreover, while all cases 
were covered by minimum employment regulations, market actors with power advantage over 
labour tended to practise ‘exit options’ to evade institutional rules, further reinforcing 
marketisation. Nevertheless, the data also show that labour process and reputational factors 
mediated the employment effects of marketization. However, the strongest examples of more 
socially desirable employment practices were predominantly motivated by clients’ desires to shore 
up their market reputations rather than by the continuing and evident labour process shortcomings. 
 
How market actors shape subcontracting and employment conditions  
Research on subcontracting suggests the characteristics of marketization and the associated 
employment conditions are shaped by the varied market actors, namely the client organisations, 
subcontractor organisations and trade unions (where present) (e.g. Colling, 2005; Holst, 2014; 
MacKenzie, 2000). However, as we discuss below, institutional factors and labour process 
conditions influence the incentives for, and limits to, actors’ actions and their employment effects. 
This section derives three research propositions from the literature on the marketization of 
employment conditions through subcontracting. 
 
The service contract: market making and employment implications 
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Research on subcontracting identifies the market-making actions of organisations and their 
consequences for employment conditions. Subcontracting of a production segment exposes 
workers to intensified cost pressures by specifying standard units such as time (care work), code 
(IT work), or floor space (cleaners) as a basis for cost competition within contracts (Bolton and 
Wibberley, 2014; Cunningham and James, 2009; Howcroft and Richardson, 2012; Rees and 
Fielder, 1992; Warhurst et al., 2008). Even services kept in-house may be benchmarked against 
market standards by managers inviting external bids to deliver a service unit (Walsh and Deery, 
2006).  
Importantly, subcontracting is not a one-off, anonymised market exchange, but instead an 
ongoing, complex process, shaped by repeated competition for client contracts and the specific 
conditions of procurement (e.g. contract length, risk of contract loss, unit fee level). Repeated 
interactions within the contract period are also critical as they may allow client managers to 
demand new service activities or reductions in the contracted unit cost, to tighten accounting and 
performance controls (Colling, 2005) and to exert an indirect influence on employment through 
their role as ‘principal patron’ (MacKenzie, 2000: 719-20). The contracting relationship thus acts 
as an institutional bridge for transmitting cost pressures to employment practices. Hard-to-meet 
performance indicators may encourage the adoption of flexible low-cost practices, such as limited 
pay progression, piece-rate pay, irregular working hours, agency work, or zero hours contracts 
(ZHCs) (Rubery et al., 2015; Cunningham et al., 2014; Kirov and Hohnen, 2015; Walsh and 
O’Flynn, 2000). Clients may also exercise ‘particularistic relationships’ that have a more direct 
influence through, for example, the arbitrary ‘power of veto’ over which subcontracted workers 
are deployed or whose performance deserves recognition (Allen and Henry, 1997: 188). 
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Internalisation of market-like cost pressures within the contract appears particularly likely 
where the subcontractor is over-dependent on the client or faces strong competition for the 
contract. For example, Carroll et al. (2005) found that airlines exploited their purchasing power to 
secure low-cost baggage handling contracts and switched subcontractors if a handling firm 
accumulated ‘too much’ power. Perraudin et al. (2014) showed that clients’ cost pressures 
cascaded down tiers of subcontractors, creating sustained downwards pressure on wages. Relative 
bargaining power and ease of replacement may also influence whether subcontractors secure 
financial redress for new service demands (Grimshaw et al., 2002). Overall, this research informs 
the first proposition that the organisational structuring of contracts for subcontracted services 
generates significant, although varied, pressures on labour costs. 
 
Regulation of employment: bending and evading institutional rules 
Institutional rules constrain the nature of market-making actions through subcontracting and their 
employment effects. Countries use varied statutory and collectively bargained instruments that 
counter marketised conditions in product and labour markets to satisfy specific (albeit contested) 
societal and sectoral interests (Doellgast et al., 2016; James et al., 2015; Marchington and Vincent, 
2004). In the UK, the most relevant regulations shaping subcontracted work are the statutory 
minimum wage, Transfer of Undertakings Protection of Employment (TUPE1) regulations and 
rights to equal treatment and redundancy conditions. Overall, the more that actors’ pursuit of 
marketization is constrained by institutional rules, the better are subcontracted workers’ 
employment conditions.  
However, variations in employment practices within countries or sectors provide support 
for theories that stress the indeterminate effects of institutions on employment outcomes (Lee and 
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McCann, 2014). Employers may choose to ignore or fudge the rules, especially in a socio-political 
environment where dominant actors support the logic of cost-reducing market actions. Empirical 
evidence is longstanding, including Rees and Fielder’s (1992) finding that contract cleaning firms 
deliberately employed staff on less than 16 hours to avoid statutory redundancy entitlements. Holst 
(2008) reported that subcontractors in the Austrian telecommunications sector escaped the 
provisions of a purposefully-extended collective agreement by using freelancers.  Likewise, an 
international review of  call centre subcontracting found that legal loopholes and trade union 
weakness provided opportunities for employers to practice ‘institutional avoidance’ by adopting 
flexible employment forms to lower labour costs (Doellgast et al., 2009). 
Recent contributions clarify these findings’ theoretical value for understanding dynamic 
changes in the balance of marketisation and institutional rules. Jaehrling and Méhaut (2013: 707) 
apply the concept of ‘rule enactment’ to highlight evidence of actors circumventing both formal 
agreements and informal custom and practice on legal and illegal grounds in ways that change ‘the 
nature … of the [institutional] fabric itself’. These issues inspired the second proposition, that 
employment management by subcontractor firms is shaped by both the institutional rules and the 
opportunities to evade them. 
 
Moderators of marketisation: labour process and reputational factors 
As direct and indirect employers, subcontractor and client organisations (respectively) walk the 
usual tightrope between controlling their workforce and seeking a degree of workforce 
cooperation. However, these labour process factors play out in the particular context of inter-
organisational contracting that ‘redefines the boundaries between the internal and external labour 
markets’ (MacKenzie, 2000: 710). Consequently, workforce management – responding to 
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pressures for labour availability, specific skill-sets and experience – takes on particular 
characteristics.  
As discussed, the position of the subcontractor is constrained by the specifications of the 
contract. However, to meet clients’ performance (and cost) targets, they may seek to exploit a 
‘fissured’ landscape of workers (Weil, 2014), in which subcontracted workers are less able to forge 
alliances with workers with higher skill and bargaining power (Flecker and Meil, 2010; Holst, 
2014). Managers may therefore exercise unilateral prerogative (and clients may expect this), 
especially where institutional sources for countervailing power are weak. They may also be better 
positioned than client organisations to access new labour supply pools such as non-unionised 
workers and migrants. Recurrent subcontracting is one tool (see above) that may be used to reform 
the employment relationship in the employer’s favour, even when the same subcontracted workers 
are retained; as Allen and Henry put it, risk becomes ‘inscribed’ in the subcontracting relationship 
creating ‘regular insecure work’ (1997: 187). Outsourcing may thus inform a specific business 
model that shuns trade unions, experiments with flexible employment forms and ties contract 
performance to employment conditions. 
At the same time, client concern for service quality may lead to the application of minimum 
standards across the whole workforce, whether or not directly employed. In adult social care, 
Cunningham and James (2007: 366) report that while contracts were mostly arms-length, clients 
nevertheless sought, ‘highly detailed and transparent job or task specifications, and requirements 
regarding performance standards and continuous improvement.’ Client organisations may also 
seek to inculcate a sense of shared organisational citizenship and skill formation among both 
directly-employed and subcontracted workers. In MacKenzie’s (2000) study, the 
telecommunications client pressured subcontractors to establish an accredited training programme 
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(requiring client audit) to ensure continued flows of skilled engineers. In a study of collaborative 
outsourcing partnerships (Grimshaw et al., 2010), clients required subcontracted workers to 
complete client-led induction training and offered integrated career paths between organisations 
through ‘truncated internal labour markets’ (Rees and Fielder, 1992). Similarly, Kessler et al.’s 
(1999) investigation into outsourced housing benefit services found employees’ perceived career 
opportunities improved significantly due to opportunities in the large subcontracting company, 
albeit alongside downsizing and work intensification (see, also, Mitchell and James, 2017). Staff 
retention and accumulated knowledge among the subcontracted workforce (facilitated by TUPE 
rules) may benefit both clients and subcontractors since it facilitates service continuity and the 
meeting of performance targets (Walsh and Deery, 2006: 575). Business pressures for available 
labour (hours and skill) may therefore moderate the tide of cost-led marketisation of work through 
subcontracting. 
Alongside but separate from labour process factors, reputational concerns may exert a 
similar effect. Where a client’s brand is tied to social responsibility, it may encourage or require 
subcontractors to provide decent employment conditions, such as a living wage, equality rights or 
no ZHCs (Lakhani et al., 2013; McCrudden, 2012). For example, reputation and industrial 
relations risks led the client responsible for the London Olympics Park to establish a framework 
agreement requiring subcontractors to conform to the ‘ethos’ of direct employment (minimising 
use of bogus self-employment) and to match conditions set in the relevant construction industry 
collective agreement for directly employed staff (Druker and White, 2013: 570). The successes of 
London living wage campaigns provide another well-known illustration. These different 
considerations inform the third proposition that pressures for marketisation of subcontracted 
services may be moderated by labour process and reputational concerns. 
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 Taken together, these three propositions respond to a need to deepen theoretical and 
empirical research on the sociology of markets in a manner that is more attentive to actor-led 
(rather than disembodied) processes, endogenous and contingent (rather than exogenous) 
responses, and social and operational (rather than solely economic) factors. The key constituent 
research literatures that shed light on the underlying, real-world processes of marketization are 
those of comparative employment relations and organisational labour process theories. These, 
unlike say transaction cost or game theory modelling, point (albeit with different frames of 
reference) to the importance of specific contracts and regulatory conditions, and of operational and 
reputational concerns. Moreover, both literatures are international in scope and therefore 
effectively highlight the multiple possibilities for variation under different institutional and 
organisational conditions. The three propositions thus seek to unpack the influences of outsourcing 
contracts, institutional rules, and operational and reputational factors. They combine to address the 
article’s overall research aim to investigate the multiple, contingent and competing roles of clients 
and subcontractor organisations in making markets, adapting to (and evading) institutional rules, 
and managing the labour process and reputational effects. 
 In light of this aim, the following section shows how the research was designed to gain a 
more precise understanding of how marketization impacts on employment. Next, the article 
analyses the qualitative data by systemising the results according to each of the three propositions 
in turn, as listed above. The article ends by discussing the key contributions for contemporary 
sociological theory about processes of marketization. 
 
Research design 
11 
 
The contract cleaning industry exemplifies highly cost-competitive contracting and labour 
intensive, low-wage subcontracted services. In 2015 the UK industry generated £8.8 billion 
turnover, employed 511,000 workers, 78% of them female and, alongside hospitality, had the 
lowest level of median earnings (AMA Research, 2015; ASHE data2). A qualitative, comparative 
method was designed to investigate the three research propositions, involving detailed examination 
of the heterogeneous interactions between different factors across organisational settings (Yin, 
1994). During 2015, data were collected from 12 case studies, each consisting of the client and 
subcontracting firm. All client organisations were large-sized and selected from across the UK. 
The research also drew on contract-related documentation and HR data on terms and conditions of 
employment. The comparative approach fills a knowledge gap in exploring potential variety of 
client and subcontractor practices, although we acknowledge that a focus on fewer cases would 
have allowed more in-depth understanding of the context-specific uniqueness of each 
subcontracting arrangement and exploration of employees’ perceptions. 
Potentially ‘information-rich’ case studies were selected using non-random, purposeful 
sampling, subject to the authors’ available time and resources and the willingness of informants to 
participate (Patton, 2002). The aim was to construct a sample that would highlight similarities and 
differences in the phenomena of subcontracting and employment practices within and across the 
chosen sectors (table 1). Three criteria were used. The first was variety of client sector to explore 
diverse operational, financial and labour process demands. For example, the organisational ethos 
and stronger worker voice within public sector clients may restrain cost-cutting pressures, although 
this may be reversed under austerity. Sector-specific operational demands may also impact 
differently on cleaning services, whether they stress speed (in hotels), risk (to patients’ health in 
hospitals), or security (passengers in airports).  
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[Table 1 here] 
 
The second criterion was to select matched pairs (two per client sector) to facilitate direct 
comparisons of cases with similar operational demands and to illuminate actor agency in shaping 
and enacting markets. Thirdly, one case within each pair was selected on the basis of having one 
or more identifiable ‘decent employment practice’, namely basic pay above the minimum wage 
(typically a ‘living wage’), limited use of ZHCs, and/or union representation (see Detert  and 
Treviño, 2010: 251 on sampling ‘extreme/polar’ cases). The one exception was the pair of hospital 
clients, which were both covered by National Health Service (NHS) terms and conditions. The 
presence of a Private Finance Initiative (PFI) agreement covering subcontracted ancillary services 
was selected here as an alternative distinguishing feature, since this exerts private investor pressure 
on managers to maximise contract profitability. This design choice facilitated investigation into 
both how subcontracting arrangements and employment conditions are mediated by client and 
subcontractor actions and why marketisation may be more limited in some contexts than others. 
76 interviews were conducted, primarily with managers in procurement, HR and contract 
management (table 1). At least one interview per case was undertaken with a worker (cleaner or 
supervisor, sometimes also a union representative) to gain insight into the experience of work. 
Interviews lasted around 60 minutes with managers and 30 minutes with workers. Themes 
addressed included subcontracting practices, operational and financial pressures, staff transfers, 
HR practices, and client-subcontractor relations. Interviews were semi-structured, digitally 
recorded and transcribed verbatim. Follow-up calls and emails helped to clarify issues. All 
participants received a summary report. 
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Interview data were analysed using thematic analysis from a direct reading of transcripts 
so that findings could be checked against knowledge of the organisational and institutional context. 
The interview schedule provided an initial basis for codes, and subthemes were added through an 
iterative coding process (Cassell and Lee, 2009). This approach ensured analysis was guided by 
relevant literature while allowing flexibility for interpreting emergent themes and the diversity of 
actors’ perspectives.  
 
Findings 
This section presents the research evidence around the three propositions regarding the 
organisational structuring of contracts, the institutional rules shaping employment and the 
moderation of marketization through labour process and reputational factors. 
 
An anatomy of contracting arrangements 
Analysis of the 12 contracts for cleaning services reveals five features that shed light on 
market-making actions and the heterogeneity of ‘marketised’ cost pressures. Taken together these 
five dimensions illustrate different types and temporalities of client pressures on labour costs (table 
2). The first, contract duration, varied from three to five years except at Hotel2 (one year) and 
Hospital2 (ten years linked to a 35-year PFI contract). In seven cases, clients had renewed contracts 
at least once with the incumbent cleaning company, extending duration to 20 years at Hospital2 
and 15 years at University1 and Hospital1. As might be expected, short duration with limited 
prospects (or history) of renewal often injected uncertainty and constrained cleaning firms’ 
investments in better quality work. For example, Airport2 was working with its sixth cleaning 
firm, having switched at each contract renewal since outsourcing in 1999. Standard pay had been 
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‘gradually rationalised down’ compared to previous in-house rates through recurrent 
subcontracting. The terminal services manager considered pay was at its lowest feasible level (99p 
above the minimum wage) for the local market. A cleaning supervisor recounted her experience: 
‘They [the new cleaning firm] are like every contractor – they say this and they promise you that 
and as soon as they have got their feet under the table they don’t want to know’. 
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
Conversely, long duration via renewal of contracts can give cleaning firms breathing space to 
develop an employment strategy with decent conditions. At Hospital1 (non-PFI), in a third 
successive five-year contract with its cleaning firm, contractual labour cost pressures were 
relatively weak. The cleaning company provided secure employment contracts, regular hours and 
relatively high pay. It was also redesigning cleaning roles and investing in equipment, ‘because if 
a provider is going to invest they have got to have some period of time which they can recoup [the 
investment]’ (Hospital1 procurement manager).  
Nevertheless, long-term relationships do not guarantee decent working conditions as 
clients can use contract renewals to wrest new cost reductions. Despite working for 12 years with 
the same cleaning company, cleaners at University1, for example, had experienced with each 
contract renewal ‘examples of particular perks and privileges … being whittled away’ (Low-wage 
campaigner). At College1, cleaning firm managers complained about the ‘drastic’ cost cutting 
imposed by college managers, resulting in a near halving of the workforce when the contract was 
renewed for the second time. As such, interpreting the implications of contract duration for 
employment conditions is not straightforward. 
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A third contract feature, the inclusion of additional services alongside cleaning, applied in 
half the cases – including, security and waste services at Airport1 and janitorial services at 
College1. Expansion of subcontracted services shifted the balance of bargaining power, generating 
a degree of contractual ‘lock-in’. As a contract manager at Airport B acknowledged, this 
potentially provided leverage for the cleaning firm to win contract renewal and provide 
employment stability for cleaning staff.  
Fourthly, clients specified performance standards by either inputs (hours and tasks) or 
outputs (cleaning standards). At University1, the contract manager widened the input list to include 
a living wage, full-time jobs where possible and British Institute of Cleaning Science (BICS) 
qualifications for all site managers and 10 percent of cleaners. The paired case, College1, required 
similar BICS training. Other clients tended to specify outputs in close detail. At Airport2, three 
marks on a bathroom mirror were acceptable but more than three were not. Some client managers 
requested customer reviews (e.g. performance feedback notices outside toilets). Nevertheless, 
output specifications provided cleaning firms greater freedom than input specifications to adapt 
hours and tasks to meet performance targets; ‘It gives you flexibility …If we are working more 
efficiently then we can gain a bit of benefit from it’ (Hospital1, customer services director). 
However, there were conflicts and tensions over demarcation of responsibilities. Cleaning firm 
managers at Hospital2 complained about misunderstandings with nursing staff, including 
occasions where nurses felt toilets should be cleaned four times daily when the hospital had agreed 
to ‘a lot less than that’. 
Finally, the overall strength of client-led market pressures can be inferred from documentary 
and interview data regarding four key factors: frequency of subcontractor changes, extraction of 
cost savings, targets to improve cleaning standards and general sustaining of the status quo (see 
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Appendix table 1). The summary qualitative measures suggest only two cases were characterised 
by weak client pressures (table 2). Neither client had changed the contract specification and 
Hospital1’s senior contract manager admitted ‘getting too close to the subcontractor’, causing a 
disagreement with the hospital’s Infection Control Unit about monitoring standards. In contrast, 
client pressures at the paired Hospital2 were strong for three reasons: hospital pressures to reduce 
costs under an imposed two-year financial recovery plan, wider NHS scrutiny of PFI contracts 
(including cleaning services) and the hospital’s Infection Control Unit leading the contract renewal 
negotiations. Medium pressures prevailed at Council1, Hotel1 and Bank2 where clients mostly 
sought improved standards, including more frequent cleaning, incorporating other tasks into the 
contract, or adjusting working time to client operations. 
 
Employment practices in the cleaning firms  
Subcontractors’ employment practices confirmed the importance of both institutional rules and 
management agency in evading these rules. Pay practices were influenced by the statutory 
minimum wage and in some cases the living wage and collective bargaining. Four cleaning firms 
used the minimum wage as the ordinary rate and two firms paid 19p and 99p above but were 
nevertheless influenced by annual minimum wage changes (table 3). Four firms paid the (non-
statutory) living wage because clients specified this in the contract (but excluded staff employed 
on other contracts). The remaining two cleaning firms, both with hospitals, were covered by the 
client’s (NHS) terms and conditions thanks to local extension agreements. TUPE regulations 
applied in all 12 cases, resulting in two or more tiers of pay and conditions. For example, at 
Airport1 three basic pay levels were used: £7.50 (staff transferred from the previous 
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subcontractor), £9.50 (nightshift workers transferred from the airport), and minimum wage (all 
others). 
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
Multiple actions by cleaning firm managers countered these effects via rule evasion, 
reinforcing downwards pressures on labour costs. For example, managers reduced wage costs by 
using temporary agency or ZHC staff to avoid paying TUPE-protected rates (basic pay and 
premiums). The cleaning firm at Airport1 used ZHC staff paid the minimum wage with no 
premiums to evade the higher TUPE-protected pay for unsocial hours (£2.19 and £3.19 per hour 
more during weekends and nights). Managers at Airport2 also used ZHCs to avoid TUPE-
protected overtime premiums. These strategies illustrate a widely shared view among cleaning 
firm managers that premiums for unsocial hours, particularly weekends, were an unnecessary part 
of employment terms and conditions.  
Similar strategies existed in the hospital cases where local collective bargaining extended 
client workforce conditions to subcontracted workers. At Hospital2, the cleaning firm excluded 
agency workers for the first 12 weeks (meeting Agency Workers Regulations) despite a supposedly 
integrative approach. At Hospital1, cleaning firm managers’ actions were non-compliant in 
multiple ways: reduced Sunday premium for new recruits (though neither confirmed nor denied 
by hospital managers), reduced sick pay rates and overtime premiums and use of ZHCs and internal 
agency (‘bank’) staff not covered by the collective agreement. In a context of weak local unions 
and resources, the union representative said people feared negative repercussions: ‘I have got 
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women who are cleaners who are only getting time and a half for a Sunday and you say “Why 
don’t you….?” And [they say], “Oh no, no, no, leave it”’. 
A further evasive action was prompted by gaps in regulatory control over working hours. 
Nine cases used ZHC staff (table 3), via direct employment in eight cases and agency work at 
Hospital2. In five cases ZHCs were only used to cover absence or for new starters, but in four 
cases ZHCs were a general policy. At Hotel1, the cleaning firm followed company-wide HR policy 
by hiring all cleaners on ZHCs and paying the minimum wage; managers said their strategy meant 
hiring migrant workers because native workers refused to accept ZHCs. Managers acknowledged 
the job required valuable skills, as new recruits needed a minimum of one year’s prior relevant 
experience, but this was not reflected in better employment conditions. In other cases, managers 
required communication skills and learning capabilities. Moreover, managers sought candidates 
who could withstand ‘being on their feet for several hours and also doing a job that not many 
people want to do’ (Airport1, cleaning firm manager). Nevertheless, most cleaning firms (with the 
implicit acceptance by the client) favoured a business model of minimum employment rights and 
tolerated the negative implications for turnover and recruitment.  
 
Labour process and reputational factors 
Three labour process factors and a separate reputational factor potentially limited marketization 
pressures. The first concerns clients’ preferences for integrating cleaning into general operational 
activities for quality or cost saving reasons. At both airports cleaners were expected to respond to 
passenger queries, assist baggage handlers when volumes were high and, at Airport2, support 
passengers at biometric passport machines. A manager at Airport2 described their position as ‘a 
cleaning role and some’. Hospital managers expected cleaners to acquire tacit knowledge of daily 
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ward routines as their role is critical both to infection control and in supporting the 24/7 operation. 
At Hospital1, operational integration included covering switchboard operators’ breaks and serving 
patients drinks. This conflicted with maximising the efficiency of cleaning itself. The cleaning 
firm’s customer services director described it as ‘an absolute pain in the backside because it 
disrupts their cleaning regime’. Both hotels regarded cleaning as a core quality indicator and local 
managers would have preferred in-house cleaners, due to problems sourcing subcontracted 
cleaners outside regular hours, but were unable to change headquarters policy. 
These operational concerns prompted client managers to influence training provision. The 
airports provided in-house training to cleaners to improve information assistance to passengers. 
The hospitals trained subcontracted cleaners in NHS codes of conduct and rules for hygiene and 
chemical use, although efforts at Hospital2 were undermined by high agency use and the associated 
high turnover. At College1, the client required cleaners to complete a three-hour course on working 
with vulnerable adults. Client managers in all these cases believed the additional skills were vital 
to integrate subcontracted staff with the client’s ethos and culture. In other cases, training remained 
the responsibility of the cleaning company. At Hotel1, however, the contract manager feared a 
new subcontractor training scheme to improve productivity would not meet the hotel’s 4-star brand 
expectations and indicated the hotel would intervene if this proved to be the case. 
A second potentially constraining labour process factor was the available labour supply 
and the cleaning firm’s contractual needs to secure a committed workforce and avoid high staff 
turnover. More widespread use of ZHCs was restrained by the need to offer workers stable wages 
and hours. Firms were conscious of alternative local job opportunities where relevant: ‘[Cleaners] 
will swap for £1 per hour…  We are competing with an awful lot of businesses around here’ 
(Airport2 contract manager). The need for labour informed several initiatives to improve or 
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maintain working hours. For example, shorter cleaning shifts per building at Council1 motivated 
the introduction of mobile cleaning teams to maintain longer, more attractive shifts. At Bank2, the 
cleaning firm offered extra hours to ZHC staff and volunteers were first in line for full-time day 
shift vacancies. At Hospital2 the cleaning company successfully argued for retaining dedicated 
weekend shifts, although it could not prevent the client negotiating shortened shifts during the 
week. Cleaning firm managers in these three cases said that improved working-time offers reduced 
staff turnover. However, the initiatives did not extend to improvements in pay as adjustments in 
working time and reorganised work were considered cheaper strategies. Hotel1’s cleaning 
company was prepared to lose around half its workforce each year to better paying jobs with 
prospects rather than offer guaranteed hours and pay above the minimum wage. The cleaning firm 
at Hotel2 lost a quarter of its workforce after abolishing the informal practice of allowing up to 
one-month continuous holiday leave, a rare perk which benefitted its migrant workforce. 
A third factor concerns specific efforts by cleaning companies to retain key staff, often 
supervisors or site managers, with many years’ experience. TUPE protections for worker 
continuity underpinned these management efforts and glued together a highly disruptive cycle of 
short-term contracts. In most cases, cleaning company managers proactively retained one or two 
individuals for their accumulated tacit knowledge of the client’s cleaning operations. At Airport2, 
a short-term contract with no renewals for the cleaning company was made feasible by continued 
employment of a longstanding site manager, whose experience smoothed out the challenges caused 
by short-term subcontracting: 
‘I think I have got a good working relationship with all my [workforce] and [client contract 
manager]. I have known them for a long time so I feel like I give them what they need or I 
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hope I do, but I wouldn’t be here if I didn’t would I?’ (Airport2, cleaning firm site 
manager). 
 
A final factor reflects reputation and social responsibility concerns. In all four cases paying 
a living wage, it was the client who required the subcontractor to pay a living wage to match the 
pay policy for their own workforces (table 3). The banking clients were responding to public 
perceptions of unfairness due to high pay for directly-employed staff, while for Council1 and 
Unversity1 it fitted with their CSR agendas including reducing poverty in the locality. These 
motivations related specifically to improving pay, with improved worker commitment an 
unexpected bonus for managers: ‘[the living wage] is actually quite a benefit. You are not getting 
the [high] level of turnover and churn, so you are not continually having to recruit’ (Bank2 
procurement manager). Council2 also had a living wage policy for its own workforce but the HR 
manager argued against imposing it on subcontractors. 
However, the superficiality of reputational effects is underlined by evidence that these 
same clients cut costs in less visible areas; for example, Council1 reduced numbers of cleaners by 
25%. Subcontractors required to pay living wages by the clients were as likely as others to avoid 
additional payments for qualifications/experience, overtime and unsocial hours, to provide 
negligible pay premiums for supervisors (table 3), or to ban breaks during short-hours shifts. 
University1’s site manager told us, ‘There are no excuses –“Oh, I stopped for a cup of tea or I 
stopped to have a sandwich” – their hours don’t allow that’. A living wage policy on one contract 
was not associated with more progressive pay strategies at the cleaning firms; only one cleaning 
company (at Bank2) was an accredited Living Wage employer. Managers acknowledged its 
benefits (e.g. lower recruitment costs) but insisted pay had to align with contractual fees. 
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Discussion 
Drawing on new empirical evidence, this article contributes to contemporary sociological theory 
about processes of marketization with a focus on the roles of market actors and the implications 
for the employment relationship. The research was designed to provide a fine-grained, actor-led 
account of market structure (Harvey et al., 2007). It revealed a variety of market-making actions 
(subcontracting practices and cost-reducing actions), instances of management compliance and 
non-compliance with protective institutional rules, and adaptive behaviours in response to labour 
process considerations. As such, it counters a tendency to present market factors as exogenous or 
disembodied processes by extending current understanding about the recursive relationship 
between actors, markets and institutions. 
The findings demonstrate that processes of marketization are proactively shaped by key 
market actors (in this research, client and subcontractor organisations). A first key point is that 
client organisations act as reflexive market-makers: they inject price competition with each tender 
for services and enact continuous cost-reducing pressures through frequent re-specifications of 
unit fees and performance targets. There is a clear business rationale for such actions; clients 
benefit from exploiting market rules to extract economic advantage and can rely on subcontractors’ 
compliance. Nevertheless, the investigated cost-reducing actions are heterogeneous across the 
cases - revealed by the varied contractual types and temporalities of pressures on labour costs – 
such that there is no standard, uniform marketised arrangement for subcontracted cleaning 
services. Reasons for differentiation include financial pressures on the client, strength of ties 
between client and subcontractor managers (which shape each party’s relative bargaining power), 
and the scope of subcontracted services. Market outcomes are thus shaped by organisational and 
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relational factors in a contingent fashion (Thiemann and Lepoutre, 2017), reflecting varied ‘local 
actions’ of translation (Campbell, 2004: 80-1). 
With respect to the effects of marketised subcontracting arrangements on the employment 
relationship, actors’ roles as market-makers interact with their capacity and willingness to enact 
institutional rules that impose social obligations. Despite a societal ethos in the UK that contracting 
parties abide by minimum social obligations (minimum wage, TUPE regulations, collective 
bargaining where present), this article shows client and subcontractor organisations are both rule-
takers and rule-evaders (Doellgast et al., 2015; Holst, 2014) and highlights what Streeck refers to 
as ‘an ethos of unruliness that makes [capitalist actors] subvert extant social order in rational-
egoistic pursuit of economic gain’ (2009: 5). The 12 cleaning firms provided examples of 
employers dodging collectively-agreed conditions by using temporary agency workers, hiring new 
recruits on ZHCs to limit employment rights, and using agency and ZHC staff to escape overtime 
and weekend premiums for staff with TUPE-protected conditions. The findings confirm the ‘ease 
of exiting’ employment forms based on the strength and costs of statutory and collectively-
negotiated protections (Doellgast et al., 2015). It is striking that these low-wage, flexible 
employment practices were used by all 12 cleaning companies, including at the two hospitals 
where collectively-negotiated employment conditions should have protected against these 
practices. In another time and space, collective institutions might indeed have imposed more order 
on standards of contract cleaning work, generating, for example, uniform rules or norms on fair 
pay rates, working hours and progression routes. Further research might usefully explore these 
issues in other subcontracted service industries given the narrow focus of this article on the UK 
contract cleaning industry. 
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Unruly management actions were nevertheless somewhat moderated by labour process and 
reputational factors. The inclusion of case studies with better employment practices within the 
matched-pair design illuminated the agency of clients and subcontractor organisations in fuelling 
or restraining downward marketization pressures even within a similar sectoral context.  The data 
highlighted three potential labour process constraints on market-making actions, associated with 
differences in cleaning’s contribution to operational and quality goals, labour availability 
pressures, and the benefits from retaining expert staff. However, in practice, labour process issues 
were mainly resolved through better contract security and worker training, not by increasing basic 
pay or rewarding cleaners for unsocial hours work or additional skills. If recruitment and turnover 
issues became too extreme another course of action was to change labour supply to more 
disadvantaged migrants.  
Furthermore, all the apparent living wage success stories remained isolated advances as 
large cleaning firms considered paying at or close to the minimum wage to be the norm for cleaning 
staff with upwards adjustments only on a contract by contract basis. Importantly, the living wage 
policies were aimed at protecting the clients’ reputation, not resolving problems in the cleaning 
labour process. This illustrates that collective action on clients can secure some gains but these are 
unlikely to be generalised as a norm. Collective action thus now needs to focus on a better overall 
employment deal from the powerful large subcontracting services companies (Bowman et al., 
2015). 
The framework used here has thus unpacked ‘marketization’ by distinguishing the interplay 
between contracts, regulations and labour process considerations. In the case of UK cleaning, the 
moderating factors have proved mainly insufficient significantly to impede the marketization 
processes pursued by clients and subcontractors, with even the steps taken to protect reputation 
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shown to be limited. This does not mean that marketisation has resolved all the ambiguities 
inherent in the labour process. Instead each case has revealed diverse tensions related to skills, 
recruitment, retention, training and quality assurance; as Hyman has argued, the competitive 
conditions in particular environments may mean that managers are at best able to find alternative 
routes to ‘partial failure’ (Hyman, 1987: 30). In this context, improving employment conditions in 
the specific industry of cleaning is dependent on strengthened regulation and enforcement. In other 
sectors and countries, less shaped by cost pressures and more by the moderating factors identified 
here (of unions, more successfully enforced regulation, and greater labour process needs), a 
different resolution of these tensions between marketization pressures and the realities of the 
subcontracted labour process can be expected.    
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Notes 
1. TUPE regulations (2006) conform to the 1977 EU Acquired Rights Directive (revised 1998, 2001). 
TUPE guarantees continuity of employment and protection of terms and conditions at the point of 
transfer.  
2. See https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/earningsandworkinghours/ 
bulletins/annualsurveyofhoursandearnings/2015provisionalresults. 
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Table 1. Details of case-study interviews 
 
Case study Client 
ownership 
No. of 
subcontracted 
cleaning staff 
(headcount) 
 Total no. 
of 
interviews 
No. of interviews with: 
 Client 
managers 
Cleaning 
company 
managers 
Cleaners or 
union reps. 
Airport1 Public/private 90  7 3 3 1 
Airport2 Private 70  6 3 2 1 
College1 Public 20  5 2 2 1 
University1 Public 26  6 3 1 21 
Hotel1 Private 15  8 3 4 1 
Hotel2 Private 20  7 3 3 1 
Hospital1 Public 100  5 2 2 1 
Hospital2 Public 350  7 1 4 2 
Council1 Public 56  5 2 2 1 
Council2 Public 18  7 3 2 2 
Bank1 Private 20  6 3 2 1 
Bank2 Private 5  7 3 2 2 
Note: 1. One interviewee was a low-wage campaigner closely involved with the cleaning company. 
 
Table 2. Core features of case-study contracting arrangements 
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1 Length of current contract (years) 5 3 3 5 3 1 5 10 4 5 5 4 
2 Number of contract renewals 1 0 2 2 3 0 2 1 0 0 1 0 
3 Additional services contracted Y Y Y N N N Y Y N N Y N 
4 Input or Output specification O O I I I I O O O I I O 
5 Strong or Weak client pressures S S S S M S W S M S W M 
Note: Details in Appendix Table 1; Client pressures are coded as S=strong, M=medium, W=weak. 
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Table 3. Cleaning firms’ pay and employment practices 
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1. Pay above minimum wage 0 99p 19p 134
p 
0 0 102p 102p 134p 0 134p 249p 
2. Living wage paid to 
subcontracted workforce at 
this site 
N N N ✓ N N N N ✓ N ✓ ✓ 
3. Collectively-bargained pay N N N N N N ✓ ✓ N N N N 
4. Pay increment for 
qualifications or experience 
N N N N N N ✓ 
40p 
✓
37p 
N N N N 
5. Pay premiums for overtime 
and unsocial hours1 
£1 
nights 
56p 
nights 
n.a. N N N 50-
100% 
50-
100
% 
50% 
w/en
ds 
50p 
w/ends 
N W/en
ds 
6. Pay differential for 
supervisory staff 
--3 99p 19p 35p --3 £1 23-
134p 
23-
134p 
£1-2 46p £1 --3 
7. Main employment contract FT FT FT/
PT 
PT ZH
C 
FT/
PT/
ZH
C 
PT PT FT/P
T 
PT/Z
HC 
PT FT/P
T 
8. Use of ZHC/agency2 
 
C E N N G G C G C G N C 
9. Trade union representation N N N N Y N Y Y Y N N Y 
Note: data refer to non-TUPE staff; 1. Unsocial hours generally refer to hours outside 08.00-18.00; 2. C=cover, E=new entrants, 
G=general use, N=not used; 3. No data provided. 
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Appendix Table 1. Characteristics of contracts for cleaning services 
 
 Start-end date, 
(renewals, initial 
start) 
Additional 
services 
contracted 
Input/output 
specification 
Nature of client pressures: switch 
subcontractors, extract cost 
savings, improve cleaning 
standards, sustain status quo 
Airport1 2014-19 (one 
renewal, 2012) 
Waste, pest 
control, security 
Output (zonal 
allocation) 
Extract costs  and improve standards 
(strong) 
(2012 changed output specification to 
cut costs  and improve standards; 
2014 renewal within contract term to 
expand services) 
Airport2 2014-17 Waste, some 
passenger advice 
(‘hosting’) 
Output (zonal 
allocation) 
Switch subcontractors (strong) 
(different subcontractor every 
contract) 
College1 2014-17 (2 
renewals, 2008) 
Janitorial Input (hours and 
tasks)  
Extract costs  and improve standards 
(strong)  
(2012 contract review to cut costs) 
University1 2012-17 (2 
renewals, 2002) 
(One of six small 
cleaning 
subcontractors) 
Input (hours, tasks) Extract costs (strong) 
(Annual review with 6-12m 
extension options) 
Hotel1 2013-16 (3 
renewals, 2004) 
None Defacto input (2.4 
rooms and 4 rooms 
per hour) 
Extract costs (medium) 
(intention to respecify contract to 
reduce turnaround times) 
Hotel2 2014-15 None 
 
Defacto input (3 
rooms per hour) 
Extract cost savings (strong) 
(Annual cost review) 
Hospital1 2013-18 (2 
renewals, 2003) 
Switchboard, 
portering, 
catering, security, 
car parking 
Output Status quo (weak) 
Hospital2 2011-21 (1 
renewal, 2001) 
Estate services 
and soft services 
(catering, retail, 
helpdesk, 
portering, patient 
dining, laundry) 
Output Extract costs  and improve standards 
(strong)  
(2011 respecification to cut costs  
and extend contract to cover estates) 
Council1 2012-16 None Input (hours) Improve standards (medium) 
Council2 2013-18 None Input (hours) Switch subcontractors (strong) 
(third different subcontractor) 
Bank1 2009-14 (1 
renewal, 2004) 
Reception 
services  and 
maintenance 
services 
Input (hours and 
tasks) 
Status quo (weak) 
(No change in ten years) 
Bank2 2010-14 None Output  Improve standards (medium) 
 
 
 
 
